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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
EASTERN DIVISION
LISA LEE, et al.,
Plaintiff, Case No. 2:07-cv-1230
JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST
v. Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King
CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to the 
Individual Claims of Plaintiff Paula Lee (“Defendants’ Motion”) (Doc. # 139), Plaintiff Paula 
Lee’s Memorandum Contra Defendants’ Motion (Doc. # 165), in which Lee requests oral 
argument on Defendants’ Motion (“Lee’s Request for Oral Argument”), and Defendants’ Reply 
to Plaintiff Paula Lee’s Memorandum Contra Defendants’ Motion (Doc. # 175). For the reasons 
that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.
I. Background
Plaintiff Paula Lee (“Lee”) began her employment with Defendant City of Columbus in 
the Department of Public Safety, Division of Police, Bureau of Communications in 1997. 
Throughout her employment, Lee held the position of a communications technician. 
Communications technicians are civilians and are members of the American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees, Ohio Council 8, Local 1632 (“AFSCME”). The terms and 
conditions of their employment are governed by the collective bargaining agreement negotiated 
between AFSCME and the City of Columbus. (Doc. # 139, Ex. B). The CBA provides benefits 
including vacation, sick leave, injury leave, short term disability leave, and health insurance.
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Communication technicians may receive up to twenty-six weeks of paid short term disability 
leave per calendar year. The Division of Police pays short term disability benefits, but employs 
a third party vendor to act as a fiduciary in administering the benefits. As of 2007, Aetna was 
administering short term disability leave for the Division of Police.
From 2003 forward, in response to Lee’s application and her physician’s statement, the 
City of Columbus had certified her migraine headaches as a condition qualifying for approved 
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. 2601, et. seq. Lee 
continued to utilize FMLA leave and her provided sick leave throughout the remainder of her 
employment to take time off because of her migraine headaches. During 2006, Lee exhausted all 
of her available leave, receiving 191.7 hours of paid leave (sick leave or paid FMLA/vacation or 
FMLA/sick leave) and 145.3 hours of FMLA leave without pay. (Doc. # 175, Ex. C, Second 
Affidavit of Linda Guyton1 (“Second Guyton Aff.”) ^ 6.)
The Division of Police employees are considered absent without leave (“AWOL”) when 
they mark off sick from work but have no available leave to cover the absence. (Doc. # 138, Ex. 
A, First Affidavit of Linda Guyton (“First Guyton Aff.”) ^ 9). Lee received disciplinary charges 
for marking off sick and being in an AWOL status on April 1 through 3, 2006 for 22 hours. She 
was charged with marking off and being in an AWOL status on April 13 through 14, 2006 for 16 
hours. Lee was charged with failing to follow procedure regarding a time trade while being 
marked off sick on May 13, 2006. She was charged with marking off sick for a posted overtime 
shift and being AWOL for four hours on May 2, 2006. She was charged with marking off sick 
and being AWOL for four hours on May 8, 2006. And, Lee was charged with marking off sick
1Ms. Guyton is the Human Resource Manager for the Division of Police.
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and being AWOL for four hours on May 20, 2006. (First Guyton Aff., Exs. 2-7.)
In connection with the consolidation of all of these disciplinary charges, Lee entered 
into a settlement with the Division of Police on June 20, 2006, which provided that Lee plead 
guilty to the multiple attendance violations, that she was doing so with union representation and 
was offered the right to consult an attorney, that she waived her right to file a grievance relating 
to the charges or to appeal to any other body or tribunal, that she was not pressured or coerced 
into admitting the charges, and that all parties agreed that the settlement was not to be introduced 
into any other forum or tribunal except as necessary to enforce it or to demonstrate Lee’s 
disciplinary record. (Doc. # 118, Deposition of Paula Lee (“Lee Dep.”), Ex. B.)
On June 29, 2006, Lee was charged with marking off sick and being AWOL for 16 
hours on June 2 and 3, 2006. On July 18, 2006, Lee was charged with marking off sick and 
being in an AWOL status on June 12 through June 16, 2006. (First Guyton Aff., Exs. 8, 9.)
Lee initiated a disability retirement application with the Ohio Public Employees Retirement 
System (“OPERS”) and on August 16, 2006 received approval of her request. (First Guyton Aff. 
^ 12, Ex. 1.) Lee had pending disciplinary charges at the time she resigned to take disability 
retirement. Pursuant to the City of Columbus’ policy Lee’s separation was indicated as “not in 
good standing.” (First Guyton Aff. ^ 13.)
Lee is currently receiving disability retirement benefits through OPERS. (Lee Dep. 29.) 
On August 19, 2006, Lee notified the Division of Police in a one line letter that she was 
“submitting [her] resignation effective August 31, 2006 at 2:30 p.m. due to the approval of her 
long term disability effective September 1, 2006.” (First Guyton Aff., Ex. 1.) Lee contends that 
she was forced to apply for disability retirement benefits because Defendants would not
3
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accommodate her disability, i.e., her migraine headache condition. Once the disability 
retirement benefits were approved, Lee accepted them and resigned, which she argues 
constituted a constructive discharge.
In her Third Amended Complaint, Lee brings claims for relief under the First, Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States through 42 U.S.C. §1983 
(“Section 1983”), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 790, et. seq., and the 
Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112. (Doc. # 109 ^  103-134, 223-238.) In Lee’s memorandum 
in opposition, she specifically withdraws her Section 1983 claim based upon Defendants’ alleged 
violation of her constitutional liberty interests. (Doc. # 165 at 6 of 38.)
II. Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for judgment as a matter of law 
if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether 
there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, the evidence “must be viewed in the light most 
favorable” to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). 
Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, “that is, if the 
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The “party seeking summary 
judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its 
motion, and identifying those portions” of the record which demonstrate “the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden 
then shifts to the nonmoving party who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
4
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In ruling on a motion for summary judgment “[a] district court is not . . . obligated to 
wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the 
nonmoving party’s claim.” Glover v. Speedway Super Am. LLC, 284 F. Supp. 2d 858, 862 (S.D. 
Ohio 2003) (citing InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F. 2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989)). Instead, 
a “court is entitled to rely, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on a 
particular issue, only upon those portions of the verified pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits submitted, specifically called 
to its attention by the parties.” Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
III. Analysis
A. The Rehabilitation Act -  Discrimination
To recover on a claim of discrimination under either the [Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”)2] or the Rehabilitation Act, 
which in this circuit share the same substantive standard, “a plaintiff must show 
that: 1) he is an individual with a disability; 2) he is otherwise qualified to 
perform the job requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation; and 3) 
he was discharged solely by reason of his handicap.”
Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397, 404 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90
F.3d 1173, 1178 (6th Cir. 1996) andMacy v. Hopkins County Sch. Bd. o f Educ., 484 F.3d 357,
363 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Lee first claims that Defendants discriminated against her by constructively discharging
2Lee argues that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), which took effect on 
January 1, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008), is applicable to the instant action. 
Defendants, however, correctly contend that the amendments to the ADA are not retroactive and 
have no application to the case at bar. See Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 299 F. App’x. 
488, 492 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008), McDonald v. UPS, No. 07-12022, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47457, at
*26 (E.D. Mich. June 5, 2009), and Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, No.: 3:07-CV-461, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 47242, at * 7-9 n.2 (E.D. Tenn. June 5, 2009) (instructive analysis and gathering of 
cases). Consequently, the Court will not retroactively apply the ADAAA to this action.
5
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her based upon her migraine headaches. Lee next contends that Defendants discriminated 
against her by failing to accommodate her or to engage in the interactive process of attempting to 
find accommodation for her.
1. Disability Discrimination Based Upon Adverse Employment Action
Lee presents circumstantial, as opposed to direct, evidence of discrimination, and, as a
result, the Court applies the familiar three step burden-shifting framework originally articulated
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and later refined in Texas Dep’t o f
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The initial burden rests with the plaintiff to
establish aprimafacie case of discrimination. Monette, 90 F.3d at 1186. If the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment decision. Burdine, 450
U.S. at 253. Should the employer carry this burden, the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s proffered reason was in fact a pretext
designed to mask illegal discrimination. See id. “[The plaintiff] can defeat summary judgment
only if his evidence is sufficient to ‘create a genuine dispute at each stage of the McDonnell
Douglas inquiry.’ ” Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d at 404 (citingMacy, 484 F.3d at 364).
To establish a prima facie case of disability-based discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must establish each of the following five elements:
(1) that he is disabled, (2) that he is otherwise qualified for the job, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, (3) that he suffered an adverse employment 
action, (4) that his employer knew or had reason to know of his disability, and (5) 
that, following the adverse employment action, either he was replaced by a 
nondisabled person or his position remained open.
Jones, 488 F.3d at 404 (citing Timm v. Wright State Univ., 375 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir. 2004) and
6
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Monette, 90 F.3d at 1185 (setting forth the sameprima facie elements under the ADA)). The 
final element “may also be satisfied by showing that similarly situated non-protected employees 
were treated more favorably.” Id. (citing Talley v. Bravo Pitino Rest., Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1246 
(6th Cir. 1995)).
With regard to the first element of the prima facie case, the parties dispute whether Lee 
was disabled at the time of her alleged constructive discharge. To be considered disabled under 
the Rehabilitation Act, an individual must (1) have a physical or mental impairment that 
“substantially limits” him or her in at least one “major life activity,” (2) have a record of such an 
impairment, or (3) be regarded as having such an impairment. DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 
418 (6th Cir. 2004) (quotingMahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 589 (6th Cir. 2002), which cited 
to 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (Rehabilitation Act definition) and 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (ADA 
definition)). The first and third categories of disabilities are at issue in the present case. 
a. Category (1): actually disabled
There is no dispute that Lee’s migraine headache condition qualifies as a physical 
impairment. Defendants also do not dispute that the activities about which Lee alleges 
substantial limitation qualify as major life activities, i.e., sleeping, thinking, concentrating, 
caring for herself, and working. However, with regard to concentrating, in an unpublished 
decision the Sixth Circuit rejected a plaintiff’s contention that her migraine headaches limited 
the major life activity of concentrating stating that “[concentration may be a significant and 
necessary component of a major life activity, such as working, learning, or speaking, but it is not 
an ‘activity’ itself.” Linser v. State o f Ohio, Dep’t o f Mental Health, No. 99-3887, 2000 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 25644, 2000 WL 1529809 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 2000). Thus, this Court will not
7
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evaluate whether Lee was substantially limited in her ability the concentrate.
The issue left before the Court then, is whether Lee’s migraine headache condition 
substantially limited Lee’s ability to engage in the major life activities of sleeping, thinking, 
caring for herself, and working. Working is to be treated “as a residual category resorted to only 
when a complainant cannot show she or he is substantially impaired in any other, more concrete 
major life activity.” Mahon, at 295 F.3d at 590 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc., 527 U.S. 
471, 492 (1999),3 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2(j), and Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 650 (6th 
Cir. 2001)).
Substantially limits means that an individual is unable to perform a major life activity 
that the average person in the general population can perform; or is significantly restricted as to 
the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life 
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the 
general population can perform that same major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1); 
Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 1997). Factors that should be 
considered in determining if a plaintiff qualifies as substantially limited in the relevant major life 
activity include:
1. the nature and severity of the impairment;
2. the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
3. the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term
impact of or resulting from the impairment.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).
3This case was superseded in part by the ADAAA.
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i. Sleeping
To support her claim of substantial limitation in the major life activity of sleeping, Lee 
argues the following:
Paula’s migraines were so serious leading up to her separation that she “was 
unable to get any kind of sleep at nights.” She states, “I would get virtually no 
sleep during a migraine. . . . I was in a constant state of fatigue.” Not only are 
Paula’s migraines affecting her ability to sleep, but Paula also suffers from Sleep 
Apnea.
(Doc. # 165 at 22, 24 of 38 citing to Doc. # 132, Second Declaration of Paula Lee (“Second Lee 
Decl.”) ^14; Doc. # 171-3 at 3 of 142, Declaration of Galen Davis, M.D. ^4; Doc. # 171-4 at 17 
of 73, Ex. 19a.) Lee also submits the declaration of her treating neurologist, Jean E. Cibula, 
M.D., which avers:
Paula reported to me that she was suffering from insomnia during the time I was 
treating her. Sleep disruption is associated with migraine, and Paula frequently 
suffered from sleep disruption during the latter years of my care for her.
(Doc. # 171-3 at 33 of 142, Declaration of Jean E. Cibula M.D. (“Cibula Decl.”) ^ 12.)
This evidence is insufficient to show substantial impairment of the major life activity of
sleeping. The Sixth Circuit has held that “[g]etting between two and four hours of sleep a night,
while inconvenient, simply lacks the kind of severity we require of an ailment before we will say
that the ailment qualifies as a substantial limitation under the ADA.” Boerst v. Gen. Mills
Operations, 25 F. App’x. 403, 407 (6th Cir. 2002). See also Swanson v. Univ. o f Cincinnati, 268
F.3d 307, 316 (6th Cir. 2001) (“While less than five hours sleep is not optimal, it is not
significantly restricted in comparison to the average person in the general population.”); Verhoff
v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 299 F. App’x 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that less than five
hours of “not restful” sleep is insufficient to constitute substantial impairment). Here, Lee was
9
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unable to sleep during a migraine; however, there is no evidence before the Court showing how 
often Lee suffered migraines during her sleep. Moreover, there is no evidence as to the duration 
of the night migraines. Thus, the Court concludes that, even when viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Lee, she has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
she was substantially limited in the major life activity of sleeping.
ii. Thinking and caring for herself
With regard to thinking and caring for herself, Lee submits her testimony that: “With the 
headaches, I suffered from vertigo, had great difficulty focusing and thinking at all. The 
multiple medications I was taking -  including the pain medications -  affected me by knocking 
me out.” (Second Lee Decl. ^12.)
Lee also submits Dr. Cibula’s declaration:
To amplify my earlier letters, one who suffers from severe migraines, as Paula 
does, will experience difficulty in thought processing and focus not only during 
the headache itself, but for some period of time after medication takes effect.
This can also be true of the effects of vertigo, photophobia and fatigue resulting 
from the headache. There are side effects from the medications, particularly 
analgesics, which can cause drowsiness, lack of focus and concentration 
following administration of the medication.
(Cibula Decl. ^ 11.) Dr. Cibula also stated that Lee’s migraine condition is “certainly
permanent.” (Id. ^ 10.)
Finally, in her deposition testimony, Lee stated that by the end of 2005 and throughout 
2006 she experienced migraines every day. (Lee Dep. at 146.) Lee also testified that during 
migraines she was required to stay in bed, could not care for herself at all, could not think or 
concentrate, could not walk or go down stairs, and could not focus to use the telephone.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Lee, the Court concludes that the
10
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evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lee was substantially 
limited in her ability to think or to care for herself. The evidence indicates that Lee suffered 
from daily migraines, that the migraine condition was permanent, that Lee could not think or 
care for herself during the migraine itself, after the migraine, and even after taking medication 
for the migraine because the medication caused Lee difficulty in concentration and focus or 
“knocked her out.” Under these circumstances, “what is necessary to ‘control’ the condition 
may be part of what makes the person disabled.’ ” Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer’s 
Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 781 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
iii. Working
Turning to Lee’s alleged substantial limitation in her ability to work, the Sixth Circuit 
instructs that she must be limited not just from her particular job, but from a substantial class or 
broad range of jobs:
To be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be 
precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of 
choice. If jobs utilizing an individual’s skills (but perhaps not his or her unique 
talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs.
Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded 
from a broad range of jobs.
Mahon, 295 F.3d at 591 (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492). Further, the court explained:
To determine if the claimant is precluded from a substantial class or broad range 
of jobs, we compare his access to jobs to the access available to a non-injured 
individual with similar training and experience, looking specifically to the labor 
market in the claimant’s geographic vicinity.
Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. 491-92 and Burns v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 
253-54 (6th Cir. 2000)).
In the instant action, Lee presents no evidence to allow the Court to “compare h[er]
11
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access to jobs to the access available to a non-injured individual with similar training and 
experience, looking specifically to the labor market in the [her] geographic vicinity.” Id. at 598 
(no genuine issue of material fact raised because the plaintiff “failed to produce any evidence 
regarding the number of pediatrics nursing jobs from which she is excluded or the availability of 
pediatric nursing positions for which she is qualified”). Consequently, the Court concludes that 
Lee has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was substantially 
impaired from the major life activity of working.
iv. Conclusion of actually disabled category 
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Lee has failed to raise a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether her migraine headache impairment substantially limited her ability 
to sleep or to work. Thus, Lee cannot establish the first element of herprimafacie case based 
upon these major life activities and Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in that regard. However, 
the Court concludes that Lee has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her 
migraine headache impairment substantially limited her ability to think and to care for herself. 
Therefore, Lee has established the first element of her prima facie case of disability 
discrimination based upon these two major life activities. Consequently, the Court must now 
determine whether Lee can establish the remaining elements of the prima facie case with regard 
to this disability. b. Otherwise qualified
To satisfy the second element of the prima facie standard, Lee must show that she was 
“otherwise qualified” to perform the communications technician job. Jones, 488 F.3d at 404. 
“An ‘otherwise qualified’ individual is one who, ‘with or without reasonable accommodation, 
can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
12
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desires.’ ” Bratten v. SSIServs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Brickers v. 
ClevelandBd. o f Ed., 145 F.3d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 1998) and 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
Defendants argue that they provided Lee with accommodations for her migraine 
headache disorder in the form of medical leaves of absence and that she was still unable to 
perform the essential functions of her employment condition. See Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 
201 F.3d 718, 726 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Plaintiff is also correct that this Circuit has recognized that a 
medical leave of absence can constitute a reasonable accommodation under appropriate 
circumstances.”); Cehrs, 155 F.3d 775, 782 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether an eight-week leave of absence followed by a request for an additional 
one-month leave was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA). Lee, however, exhausted 
all available FMLA and medical leaves of absence provided by the Division of Police. She 
argues that she should have been further accommodated with relief from mandatory overtime. In 
that regard, Defendants contend that they were not required to grant Lee’s request because 
working overtime is an essential function of the communications technician position and 
elimination of essential job functions is not required as a form of reasonable accommodation. 
Bratten, 185 F.3d at 632 (6th Cir. 1999) (an accommodation ofjob restructuring “only pertains 
to the restructuring of non-essential duties or marginal functions of a job”). In response to this 
argument, Lee contends that mandatory overtime is not an essential job function. The Court, 
however, finds it unnecessary to determine whether overtime is an essential job function because 
the evidence before it shows that Lee could not perform the communications technician job even 
if she had been given the accommodation she requested. That is, in her third declaration that she 
executed to support her memorandum in opposition to Defendants’ Motion, Lee avers that her
13
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request to be relieved from overtime did not mean that she believed she could work a forty hour 
week without accommodation.
My request to be relieved of overtime did not mean that I believed, or ever told 
anyone at the City, that I could work a 40 hour week without some form of 
accommodation. In fact, I knew that I would need accommodation even working 
a 40 hour week because of the frequency and severity of my migraines, as well as 
the unpredictability of when my migraines would hit. At the time I was making 
this request, my goal was first to stop the accumulation of unexcused absences 
resulting because of my inability to work overtime. Second, I was hopeful that 
the City would work with me and Dr. Cibula to establish some form of 
accommodation; the City never did.
(Doc. # 171-3 at 1-2 of 142, Third Declaration of Paula Lee ^2.)
Thus, Lee’s argument is that she could not have worked her job as a communications
technician without the requested accommodation of being excused from overtime and also
without some other form of accommodation -  one that she never requested. It was, however,
Lee’s burden to articulate a reasonable accommodation. This Sixth Circuit directs that:
To satisfy the second element of theprima facie standard, an employee “must 
establish that a ‘reasonable’ accommodation is possible, and bears a traditional 
burden of proof that she is qualified for the position with such reasonable 
accommodation.” Monette, 90 F.3d at 1186 n.12. The employee’s initial burden 
of articulating a reasonable accommodation need not be onerous. For the 
purposes of a prima facie showing, the plaintiff must merely “suggest the 
existence of a plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not 
clearly exceed its benefits.” Borkowski v. Valley Cent. SchoolDist., 63 F.3d 131,
138 (2d Cir. 1995). As the Second Circuit recently noted, “the regulations define 
reasonable accommodation only by example.” Id. at 136. The examples include 
“job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, . . . and other similar 
actions.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.12(b)(2).
Cehrs, 155 F.3d at 781.
Lee failed to meet her initial burden of articulating a reasonable accommodation that 
would make it possible for her to work at her position. Indeed, by her own testimony, she only 
requested to be accommodated by being exempted from the mandatory overtime requirements of
14
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the communications technician position. (See Third Amended Complaint ^ 114; Lee Dep. at 
70-71, 75, 83-84 (confirming three times during her deposition that the accommodation she 
requested was no overtime).) However, if Lee had been given the requested accommodation of 
exemption from overtime, she still would not have been able to perform her job as a 
communications technician. Lee failed to articulate to Defendants, or to this Court, what type of 
reasonable accommodation would have allowed her to perform her job. Defendants cannot be 
held liable for failing to provide an accommodation that was not requested. In this regard, the 
Court notes that not only did Lee not informally request accommodation, similar to her requests 
for exemption from overtime, she also failed to utilize the Division of Police’s standardized 
request procedure, by completing the form: “Procedures for Requesting a Reasonable 
Accommodation.” (Second Guyton Aff.^ 2.)
Based on the evidence before it, and even when construing that evidence in the light most 
favorable to Lee, the Court concludes that Lee has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether she was an ‘otherwise qualified’ individual is one who, ‘with or without reasonable 
accommodation, could perform the essential functions of the communications technician 
employment position. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion on Lee’s claim of 
disability discrimination based upon her alleged constructive discharge.
c. Category (3): Being regarded as disabled
Lee asserts that Defendants regarded her as disabled from her ability to work. “This part 
of the [Rehabilitation] Act is intended to allow individuals to be judged according to their actual 
capacities, rather than through a scrim of ‘myths, fears, and stereotypes’ accruing around a 
perceived impairment.” Mahon, 295 F.3d at 592 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489-90).
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To determine whether an individual is “regarded as disabled,” we apply the test 
laid out in Sutton:
There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within 
this statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes 
that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly 
believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits 
one or more major life activities.
527 U.S. at 489. To run afoul of the act, then, a covered entity must hold a 
mistaken belief that a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the [the 
Rehabilitation Act or the ADA]. See Ross [v. Campbell Soup Co.,] 237 F.3d 
[701,] 709 (6th Cir. 2001).
Mahon, 295 F.3d at 592.
In a “regarded as” disability discrimination claim that relies upon the major life activity 
of working, a plaintiff need only show that she is regarded as disabled from her general type of 
work in that general geographic area. Moorer v. BaptistMem’lHealth Ctr., 398 F.3d 469, 484 
(6th Cir. 2005).
In the case sub judice, Lee contends that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Defendants mistakenly regarded her as disabled from her general type of work in the 
relevant general geographic area. As support for this argument, Lee relies upon the fact that 
Defendants “facilitated” her application for short term disability and for disability retirement “by 
cooperating by providing information to Aetna and to OPERS and in not objecting to the 
applications.” (Doc. # 165 at 28 of 38.) Further, Lee relies upon her allegation that Defendants 
refused to engage in the accommodation process, which she argues indicates that they regarded 
her as disabled. Finally, Lee avers that Defendant Larry Yates informed her that she had “too 
many medical issues,” during a conversation Lee had with Yates, in which Lee requested that 
she be allowed to mark off from overtime so that she could visit a cardiologist. (Second Lee
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Decl. ^ 20.) Lee’s arguments are not well taken.
First, simply because Defendants supplied Aetna and OPERS with requested information
and did not object to Lee’s applications for disability benefits does not indicate that Defendants
regarded Lee as disabled. As a judge of this District explained in Dabney v. Ohio Dep’t. o f
Admin. Serv., No. 2:04-CV-528, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23435 (Mar. 22, 2006):
That an employer believes that an employee may qualify for disability benefits 
under a standard that is narrower than the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of 
“disability” is not evidence that the employee is “regarded as disabled” under the 
Act. Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 44 F. Supp.2d 882, 891 (E.D.
Mich. 1999), a ff’d, 227 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2000). The standards for disability 
benefits are that the employee cannot perform the essential functions of her job -­
not a broad range of jobs. See Ohio Admin. Code §§ 123:1-33-02;
123:1-33-12(C).
Given the disparity between the definition of disabled for purposes of state 
disability benefits and the definition of disabled for purposes of the Rehabilitation 
Act, defendant’s suggestion that plaintiff was qualified for state disability benefits 
because she was unable to perform the essential functions of a particular job does 
not show that defendants regarded plaintiff as disabled within the meaning of the 
Rehabilitation Act.
Id. at * 29-30; see also Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, 544 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2008).
Second, Lee’s argument that Defendants’ refusal to accommodate her shows that 
Defendants believed that Lee was incapable of performing any work, is unpersuasive. Lee relies 
upon an incident in which she brought a doctor’s note to her supervisor in an effort to be relieved 
from her scheduled overtime. Lee avers that her supervisor refused to accept the note, stating: 
“Unfortunately, medical excuses are not acceptable for getting out of overtime.” (Second Lee 
Decl. ^  18-19.) This incident in no way indicates that Lee’s supervisor regarded her as 
disabled.
Third, the comment made by Yates that Lee had “too many medical issues,” is an isolated
17
Case: 2:07-cv-01230-GLF-EPD Doc #: 212 Filed: 08/31/09 Page: 18 of 30 PAGEID #: <pageID>
remark, made well over a year before Lee took disability retirement, that is simply insufficient to 
show that Defendants regarded Lee as disabled from a the major life activity of working. See 
Rosso v. A.I. Root Co., 97 F. App’x. 517, 521 (6th Cir. 2004) (employer’s remarks that employee 
was “old” and “had severe memory loss” that appeared to be “early Alzheimer’s disease” were 
found to be “isolated and abstract since [the employee] was discharged six and one-half months 
after the November meeting [where the comments were made]”).
Finally, Lee has utterly failed to present evidence that she was regarded as “disabled 
from her general type of work in that general geographic area.” Moorer, 398 F.3d at 484, or that 
Defendants held any mistaken belief about her. See Mahon, 295 F. 3d at 592 (“Mahon has not 
shown that TVA regarded him as disabled under the [Rehabilitation Act] because he has not 
shown that TVA held any mistaken belief about him.” ) (emphasis in the original).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Lee has failed to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether Defendants regarded her as disabled, and therefore, Defendants’ Motion on 
that claim is GRANTED.
2. Disability Discrimination Based Upon Failure To Accommodate
In order for a plaintiff to prevail on an allegation of handicap discrimination 
based on failure to accommodate, he must first establish aprima facie case by 
showing that: (1) he is an individual with a handicap . . . ; (2) he is qualified for 
the position [with or without reasonable accommodation] . . . ; (3) the agency was 
aware of his disability; (4) an accommodation was needed, i.e., a causal 
relationship existed between the disability and the request for accommodation; 
and (5) the agency failed to provide the necessary accommodation. Once the 
plaintiff has presented a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to 
demonstrate that the employee cannot reasonably be accommodated, because the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its 
programs. Gaines v. Runyon, 107 F.3d 1171, 1175-76 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations 
omitted).
DiCarlo, 358 F.3d at 419.
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Here, the Court already determined that, based on the evidence in the record, Lee cannot 
establish that she was qualified for the position of communications technician. This 
determination also prevents Lee from maintaining an action for failure to accommodate her for 
her disability. See id. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as it relates to 
Lee’s claim of disability discrimination for failure to accommodate.
B. The Rehabilitation Act -  Retaliation
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits retaliation against an employee because he or she 
engaged in a statutorily protected activity. Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir. 
2001). A plaintiff “need not show that she is under a ‘disability’ to maintain a claim under the 
Rehabilitation Act based on the theory that her employer retaliated against her because she 
engaged in legally protected activities.” Ferrero v. Henderson, 341 F. Supp.2d 873, 887 (S.D. 
Ohio 2004) (citing Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp.2d 776, 801-02 (S.D. Ohio 1999) and Barrett 
v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 36 F. App’x. 835, 840 (6th Cir. 2002)). Lee relies upon 
circumstantial evidence of retaliation, and thus the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analytical 
framework applies. Gribcheck, 245 F.3d at 550 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 
802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
Aprima facie case of retaliation has four elements: 1) the plaintiff engaged in 
legally protected activity; 2) the defendant knew about the plaintiff’s exercise of 
this right; 3) the defendant then took an employment action adverse to the 
plaintiff; and 4) the protected activity and the adverse employment action are 
causally connected.
Id. (citing Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 1987)). Defendants here do not dispute 
the second element.
With regard to the first element of the prima facie case, Lee argues that she was
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constructively discharged in retaliation for complaining about an unlawful policy that required 
her to produce confidential medical information. Specifically, Columbus Police Division 
Directive (“Directive”) 3.07 § III(H)(1)(c) required employees who were returning from sick 
leave to regular duty to provide a note from his or her attending physician to his or her 
immediate supervisor. On July 15, 2009, this Court issued an Opinion and Order in which it 
declared that Directive 3.07 § III(H)(1)(c) violates the Rehabilitation Act and Section 1983 and 
permanently enjoined Defendant the City of Columbus from enforcing it. (Doc. # 183.) Lee 
contends that her complaints to her employer about Directive 3.07 § III(H)(1)(c) satisfy the first 
element of herprima facie case. The Court agrees that complaints, or opposition to, Directive 
3.07 § III(H)(1)(c) is a legally protected activity. See Johnson v. University o f Cincinnati, 215 
F.3d 561, 579-80 (6th Cir. 2000) (employee must have reasonable and good faith belief that he is 
opposing an act or practice that violated ADA). Thus, Lee has established the first element of 
her prima facie case.
With regard to the third element of the prima facie case, Lee contends Defendants failed 
to accommodate her disability and instead continued to bring disciplinary charges against her for 
missing work due to her disability, which forced her to apply for and accept disability retirement. 
Thus, Lee contends that her resignation to take disability retirement was actually a constructive 
discharge.
To constitute a constructive discharge, the employer must deliberately create 
intolerable working conditions, as perceived by a reasonable person, with the 
intention of forcing the employee to quit and the employee must actually quit. To 
determine if there is a constructive discharge, both the employer’s intent and the 
employee’s objective feelings must be examined. E.g., Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 
F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982). Intent can be shown by demonstrating that quitting 
was a foreseeable consequence of the employer’s actions.
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Moore v. Kuka WeldingSys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999).
From April 2006 through July 2006, the Division of Police brought seven disciplinary 
charges against Lee for being AWOL. It is not disputed that Lee was absent on each of these 
occasions due to her migraine headache disability. Lee was given a ten day suspension and 
testified that she was told by her supervisor that she would continue to receive progressive 
discipline for any medical absences since she had already exhausted all of the available medical 
disability leave. The Sixth Circuit has “held that an employee was constructively discharged 
when he reasonably believed his termination or demotion was imminent, Ford v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 554(6th Cir. 2002) (termination); Saroli v. Automation and Modular 
Components, Inc., 405 F.3d 446, 452(6th Cir. 2005) (demotion).” Plautz v. Potter, 156 F.
App’x. 812, 818 (6th Cir. 2005). This element presents a close question; however, the Court 
finds that the evidence is sufficient for a jury to find that a reasonable person in Lee’s position 
would have felt compelled to resign and that Lee’s resignation was a foreseeable consequence of 
the imposition of discipline in these circumstances. Thus, Lee has established the third element 
of herprima facie case.
With regard to the causal connection, the Sixth Circuit instructs that a “plaintiff may 
demonstrate the causal connection by the proximity of the adverse employment action to the 
protected activity.” Gribcheck, 245 F.3d at 551 (citing Wrenn, 808 F.2d at 501). Thus, all that is 
necessary to establish this element of the prima facie case is to show that Lee’s opposition was 
ongoing at the time of the discipline charges that resulted in the alleged constructive discharge. 
See id. (“Gribcheck showed that his litigation was ongoing at the time of his suspension, thereby 
establishing the fourth prong of his prima facie case.”). Here, Lee has met that burden,
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submitting her testimony that at some time during 2006 “she began to question supervisors about 
[the requirement to provide confidential medical information] and object to it.” (Second Lee 
Decl. ^ 9.) This was the same time period during which Lee received the numerous disciplinary 
charges that she claims resulted in her constructive discharge. Consequently, Lee has 
established the fourth element of herprima facie case.
Accordingly, Lee has met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation 
under the Rehabilitation Act. The burden of production now shifts to Defendants “to ‘articulate 
some legitimate, non[retaliatory] reason’ for its decision” to deny Lee the accommodation she 
requested and to issue disciplinary charges. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 
U.S. at 253; Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 501 (6th Cir. 1987). “Once defendant articulates the 
non[retaliatory] reasons, the Burdine presumption of discrimination flowing from the prima facie 
case automatically drops out of the case.” Wrenn, 808 f.2d at 501 (citing Weems v. Ball Metal & 
ChemicalDiv., Inc., 753 F.2d 527, 529 n.2 (6th Cir. 1985)).
Here, Defendants have met their burden by articulating a legitimate reason for denying 
Lee’s requested accommodation of exemption from overtime, i.e., that the Division of Police 
consider working mandatory overtime an essential job function of the communications 
technician position and, therefore, not subject to modification based on disability 
accommodation. Further, Defendants state that the legitimate reason they disciplined Lee was 
because she was AWOL, not in retaliation for opposing Directive 3.07 § III(H)(1)(c). Therefore, 
Lee must answer Defendants’ nonretaliatory reasons by demonstrating that a reasonable jury 
could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s stated reasons are pretextual. 
Gribcheck, 245 F.3d at 552. “Even though the burden of going forward with evidence to answer
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[the] prima facie case . . . moved to the [defendant], the ultimate burden of persuasion never 
shifted from the plaintiff.” Wrenn, 808 F.2d at 501.
Lee fails this last step of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, i.e., “to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s proffered reason was in fact a pretext 
designed to mask illegal [retaliation].” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. With regard to Defendants’ 
stated reason for disciplining Lee, Lee does not dispute that she violated the attendance work 
rules by marking off for her migraine headaches when she had no available leave to cover the 
absence, in other words she admits she was AWOL. Lee fails to provide any evidence that, 
although she violated the work rules, she was disciplined not because of these violations, but 
instead because she had complained about being required to provide confidential medical 
information.
With regard to Defendants’ assertion that Lee was not accommodated because 
Defendants considered overtime an essential function of the communications technician position, 
Lee disagrees that overtime is an essential function. However, the relevant inquiry is not 
whether overtime was an essential function of the job, but rather whether Defendants’ stated 
reason was a pretext for what was really retaliation against Lee for complaining about being 
required to provide confidential medical information. In that context, simply disputing why 
Defendants failed to accommodate Lee is not sufficient. “Disputation of the facts underlying 
[the defendant’s] legitimate business reason . . . is not sufficient to carry [the plaintiff’s] burden” 
to show pretext. Gribcheck, 245 F.3d at 552 (quoting Irvin v. Airco Carbide, 837 F.2d 724, 726 
(6th Cir. 1987). “A ‘blanket denial [of] the employer’s articulated reasons . . . is not enough; a 
plaintiff must take the extra step of presenting evidence to show that the reasons given are an
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attempt to cover up the employer’s alleged real [retaliatory] motive.’ ” Id. (quoting Irvin, 
supra). Here, Lee has failed to present evidence to show that the reasons Defendants have given 
are an attempt to cover up the employer’s real alleged motive of retaliating against Lee for 
opposing the policy of being required to provide confidential medical information.
Consequently, even taking all of Lee’s evidence in the light most favorable to her, she 
“still cannot show that a reasonable jury could find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Defendants’ stated reasons for [her disciplinary charges] are pretextual.” Id. at 553. “The 
burden of proof lies with [Lee], and [s]he has failed to meet its requirements.” Id. Accordingly, 
the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as it relates to Lee’s retaliation claim.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right 
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed 
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. 
Corr. Corp. o f Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). A municipality, may be held liable under 
Section 1983 only when the municipality itself causes the alleged constitutional violation. 
Monell v. Dep’t o f Social Servs. Of City o f New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The doctrine of 
respondeat superior does not apply; a governmental entity cannot be held liable under Section 
1983 based solely upon allegations that an employee or agent inflicted an injury. Id. at 691. 
“Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its 
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts 
the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. The Sixth 
Circuit has held that “to satisfy the Monell requirements a plaintiff must ‘identify the policy,
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connect the policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of 
the execution of that policy.’ ” Garner v. Memphis Police Dept., 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(citations omitted).
Here, Lee alleges that she was denied her constitutional rights to substantive and 
procedural due process.
1. Procedural Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property” 
without due process of law. The Court must undertake a two-step analysis when considering 
claims for the violation of due process rights. Mitchell v. Fankhauser, 375 F.3d 477, 480 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (citing Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 741-42 (6th Cir. 2000)). First, it must 
determine whether the plaintiff has a property interest entitled to due process protection. See id. 
If she has such a protected property interest, then the Court must determine what process is due. 
See id.
In the instant action, there is no dispute that Lee had a constitutionally protected property 
interest in her employment. See also Bailey v. Floyd County Bd. o f Educ., 106 F.3d 135, 141 
(6th Cir. 1997) (“Government employment amounts to a protected property interest when the 
employee is entitled to continued employment.”). Lee argues that she was deprived of that 
property without due process when the Division of Police accepted her resignation without 
giving her any other option and remaining silent on the fact that if Lee resigned her separation 
from employment would be not in “good standing,” per the policy of the Division.
With regard to the first prong of the analysis, the Sixth Circuit has explained:
A constructive discharge may constitute a deprivation of property within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Parker [v. Bd. o f Regents of
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Tulsa Jr. Coll.], 981 F.2d [1159,] 1162 [(10the Cir. 1992)] (“If, however, her 
resignation was so involuntary it amounted to a constructive discharge, 
defendants did deprive her of her property interest without due process.”); Stone 
v. Univ. o f Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1988) (“If, on 
the other hand, Stone’s resignation was so involuntary that it amounted to a 
constructive discharge, it must be considered a deprivation by state action 
triggering the protections of the due process clause.”); Findeisen v. North East 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 749 F.2d 234, 236-39 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that constructive 
discharge claim set forth the type of deprivation of property for which due process 
required a predeprivation hearing); Parrett v. Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 694 
(7th Cir. 1984) (holding that if the plaintiff was constructively discharged, he was 
deprived of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also 
Burt v. Board o f Educ., 35 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished) (suggesting 
that a § 1983 procedural due process claim can be based on a constructive 
discharge).
Nunn v. Lynch, 113 F. App’x. 55, 59 (6th Cir. 2004).
Thus, based on the Court’s conclusion supra, that Lee has raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether her resignation was a constructive discharge, the first prong of her
due process claim is met. Now, Lee “must also show that the deprivation was accomplished
without the process that was due under the law.” Id. at 60 (citingMitchell, 375 F.2d at 480 and
Parrett, 737 F.2d at 694 (holding that if the plaintiff was constructively discharged, “the only
question would then be whether he was given due process of law.”)).
There is no dispute that Lee was not given, nor did she request, a pre-deprivation hearing
or a post-deprivation hearing. As the Nunn court explained:
Because Nunn was not terminated, suspended, or demoted, he did not have a right 
to a pre-deprivation hearing under the municipality’s civil service rules. The 
rules do not provide for a hearing when an employee resigns. Even if the 
employee can later show that his resignation was not voluntary, the employer 
cannot be required to give notice before an employee takes what appears to be a 
voluntary act. Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted that “when deprivations 
of property are effected through random and unauthorized conduct of a state 
employee, predeprivation procedures are simply impracticable since the state 
cannot know when such deprivations will occur.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 533 (1984).
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On the other hand, if Nunn’s resignation was a constructive discharge, he 
arguably had a right to a post-deprivation hearing. However, Nunn has not 
alleged that the City denied a request for a post-deprivation hearing. He has not 
alleged that he ever requested a hearing.
Id. at 60-61.
Like the plaintiff in Nunn, Lee here failed to request a post-deprivation hearing, and 
therefore, cannot meet the second prong of the denial of due process test. Moreover, again like 
the Nunn court explained, even if Lee had been denied a post-deprivation hearing, she “has still 
failed to state a deprivation of due process because he has not alleged the inadequacy of state 
post-deprivation remedies.” Id. at 61.
The Supreme Court has held that the “unauthorized intentional deprivation of 
property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural 
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a 
meaningful [state] postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson, 468 
U.S. at 533. “If satisfactory state procedures are provided in a procedural due 
process case, then no constitutional deprivation has occurred despite the injury.” 
Jefferson v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch. Sys., 360 F.3d 583, 587-88 (6th Cir.
2004). Accordingly, in order to state a procedural due process claim under 
section 1983 “the plaintiff must attack the state’s corrective procedure as well as 
the substantive wrong.” Meyers v. City o f Cincinnati, 934 F.2d 726, 731 (6th Cir.
1991) (quoting Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1983)). A 
plaintiff “may not seek relief under Section 1983 without first pleading and 
proving the inadequacy of state or administrative processes and remedies to 
redress her due process violations.” Jefferson, 360 F.3d at 588. See also Marino 
v. Ameruso, 837 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Although one need not exhaust state 
remedies before bringing a Section 1983 action claiming a violation of procedural 
due process, one must nevertheless prove as an element of that claim that state 
procedural remedies are inadequate.”).
A municipality’s refusal to provide a post-termination hearing does not constitute 
a due process violation where an adequate state corrective judicial process exists. 
Meyers, 934 F.2d at 731. In Meyers a municipal civil service commission refused 
to allow an employee to be heard because it interpreted the employee’s retirement 
as voluntary. We held that the plaintiff had not shown a procedural due process 
violation where the plaintiff attacked the municipal administrative hearing 
process, but not the state’s judicial process for the correction of errors by 
administrative agencies. Id. Nunn has not alleged the inadequacy of the state’s
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judicial process for the correction of errors by administrative agencies.
Accordingly, Nunn has failed to allege a constitutional due process claim.
Id. Like the plaintiff in Nunn, Lee here has failed to attack the inadequacy of Defendants post­
deprivation processes, and therefore, has failed to allege a constitutional due process claim.
Based on the foregoing, there are no genuine issues of material fact as to Lee’s Section 
1983 claim based upon alleged violations of procedural due process. Accordingly, the Court 
GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as to that claim for relief.
2. Substantive Due Process
Lee argues that she was denied substantive due process in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution based upon her constructive 
discharge. This claim too fails because Lee has not identified any official policy or custom of 
the City of Columbus, Division of Police upon which the constitutional due process claim is 
based.
Further, the claim fails because Lee cannot set forth a constitutional deprivation. “The 
doctrine that governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property are subject to limitations 
regardless of the adequacy of the procedures employed has come to be known as substantive due 
process.” Pearson v. City o f Grand Blanc, 961 F. 2d 1211, 1216 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations 
omitted). “Substantive due process claims may be loosely divided into two categories: (1) 
deprivations of a particular constitutional guarantee; and (2) actions that ‘shock the conscience.’ 
” Valot v. Southeast Local Sch. Dist. Bd. o f Educ., 107 F. 3d 1220, 1228 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(citations omitted).
With regard to the first category, Lee relies upon her alleged deprivation of employment 
as the particular constitutional guarantee at issue. The Sixth Circuit, however, has rejected
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attempts to expand substantive due process protection to claims involving property interests in 
employment. See Sutton v. ClevelandBd. o f Educ., 958 F.2d 1339, 1350 (6th Cir. 1992).
As to the second category, there is simply nothing in this case that shocks the conscience.
The Court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to Lee’s Section 
1983 claim based upon substantive due process. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 
Motion as to that claim for relief.
D. State Law Claims
“Having so dismissed [Lee’s] federal claims, this Court presumptively should not 
address any state law claim.” See Jackson v. Heh, 215 F.3d 1326, 2000 WL 761807, at *8 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and stating that “[w]here, 
as here, a federal court has properly dismissed a plaintiff’s federal claims, there is a ‘strong 
presumption’ in favor of dismissing any remaining state claims unless the plaintiff can establish 
an alternate basis for federal jurisdiction.” (citing Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 
89 F.3d 1244, 1255 (6th Cir. 1998))). Lee has failed to suggest any justification or alternative 
basis for exercising jurisdiction over her remaining state law claims should the Court dismiss her 
federal claims.
The Court, therefore, in its discretion declines to exercise federal jurisdiction over Lee’s 
remaining state law claim for disability discrimination. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES 
without prejudice Lee’s remaining state law claim for relief.
E. Oral Argument
With regard to Lee’s Request for Oral Argument, the Court concludes that oral argument 
is not “deemed to be essential to the fair resolution of the” motions before it, and therefore
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DENIES Lee’s request. S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.1(b)(2).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion (Doc. # 139), 
DENIES Lee’s Request for Oral Argument (Doc. # 165), and DISMISSES without prejudice 
Lee’s state law claims for relief. The Clerk is DIRECTED to ENTER JUDGMENT in 
accordance with this Opinion and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Gregory L. Frost
GREGORY L. FROST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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